LSE Law Brexit special #3: Brexit and the European institutions by Finck, Michèle
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941370 
LSE L AW  POLIC Y BRIEFING SERIES
BREXIT
SPECIAL 3
Brexit and the 
European Institutions
Dr. Michèle Finck
POLICY BRIEFING 22      2017
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941370 
EU Institutions and the 
Negotiation of Brexit 
A rticle 50(2) TEU provides that the Member State wishing to withdraw from the Union is to notify the 
European Council of its intention. The 
European Council – which consists of 
the heads of state of the EU-27 – then 
establishes its own guidelines governing 
the Article 50 process. On the basis of 
these guidelines it is then for ‘the Union’ 
to negotiate withdrawal – a task that 
will fall on the Commission. The Council 
finally concludes an agreement on behalf 
of the EU on the basis of a qualified 
majority, and must secure the European 
Parliament’s approval for doing so. At 
first sight this procedure seems clear-
cut: various institutions are involved 
at various stages of the withdrawal 
process. Some uncertainty nonetheless 
remains especially as it has become 
apparent that the various EU institutions 
are eager to play an active role in the 
Brexit negotiations, presumably both in 
respect of the conditions under which 
the UK is to leave the EU but also, 
and maybe even more so regarding 
the definition of the UK’s post-Brexit 
relations towards the Union. 
In anticipation of these negotiations, the 
European Commission has appointed 
its own Brexit negotiator, former 
Vice-President of the Commission 
Michel Barnier. Yet the European 
Parliament similarly appointed its 
own ‘representative’, Belgian liberal 
Guy Verhofstadt, to ‘shape the EP’s 
negotiating position’. The latter move 
is much more surprising since Article 
50(2) TEU indicates a largely passive ex-
post role for the European Parliament in 
the negotiating process than what this 
appointment suggests. This early move 
indicates that the European Parliament 
will seek to harness its position as 
the only democratically-elected EU 
institution to have a determinative 
say in these negotiations and it is yet 
to be seen whether the Commission 
is wil l ing to accept the European 
Parliament as a co-negotiator. The 
European Parliament’s incentives for 
doing so are that this would give the 
European Parliament power over the 
Brexit process, and, additionally, would 
allow it to profile itself as a key EU 
institution, hoping to increase interests 
in its activities among European citizens. 
It should also be noted that while the 
European Council establishes the broad 
guidelines of these negotiations, it is 
also the only institution to decide on 
a possible extension of the two-year 
negotiating period that is foreseen by 
Article 50 TEU. Article 50(3) TEU indeed 
provides that the European Council 
can, in in agreement with the Member 
State concerned, unanimously extend 
the negotiation two-year period. This 
requirement of a unanimous vote 
diverges from the European Council’s 
habitual voting rules of consensus 
under Article 15(4) TEU. Some have 
wondered about European Council 
voting dynamics in this respect, noting 
that the President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, sits 
in the European Council in accordance 
with Article 15(2) TEU. Yet Article 235(1) 
TFEU tells us that neither the President 
of the European Council  nor the 
President of the European Commission 
participate in voting, meaning that 
the Commission won’t be able to use 
its vote on a possible extension of the 
negotiating period as part of its strategy 
as the Union’s main negotiator of the 
Brexit deal. The above indicates that 
while some of the rules governing 
institutions’ involvement in the Brexit 
negotiations are well defined others are 
not, and it will be particularly interesting 
to watch the European Parliament’s role 
in this context over the coming two 
years. A second uncertainty relating to 
the institutional dimension of Brexit is 
that of the influence the UK’s exit will 
come to have on various EU institutions. 
Reshaping the EU 
Institutions After Brexit 
Some of Brexit’s implications for 
institutional structures in the EU are 
obvious. The British judges and its 
Advocate General in the Court of 
Justice of the European Union will need 
to leave their posts as will the current 
British Commissioner. Many institutional 
implications of Brexit are, however, 
much less clear-cut, for instance the 
question as to whether, and if so which, 
another Member State will get the seat 
of the British Advocate General after 
2019. The United Kingdom is currently 
one of the few Member States that 
has a permanent Advocate General 
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(along with Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain and Poland). Other Member States 
get Advocate Generals on a basis of a 
rotation system. While it appears that 
Treaty amendment would be necessary 
to update the current list of permanent 
Advocate Generals some of the bigger 
Member States that do not at present 
have a permanent Advocate General can 
be expected to push for a replacement 
of the UK’s current privilege, whether 
now or on the occasion of the next 
Treaty revision. 
A longs ide  the  Commiss ion,  the 
European Council and the Council will 
be without British representation after 
Brexit, although that evolution has 
already started with the emergence of 
‘EU 27’ meetings. These evolutions will 
doubtlessly take place given that only 
Member States sit in such meetings, 
which the UK will most likely cease 
to be in the not so distant future. 
Open questions regarding institutional 
dynamics nonetheless abound. What, 
for instance, about power dynamics in 
the Council and European Council after 
the UK has left? Will large Member 
States such as Germany become more 
powerful as the counterweight of the 
UK is gone and will new blocs and 
voting patters emerge? Some indeed 
predict that voting patterns in the 
Council will change given that without 
the UK qualified majority, arrangements 
in the Council will give the ‘French-led 
protectionist bloc’ a blocking minority 
over former UK allies including Sweden, 
Germany and the Netherlands.
We must also consider the implications 
of Brexit for British citizens currently 
working for the various EU institutions, 
for instance the Commission. Most 
Brit ish cit izens should be able to 
continue working for the institution 
(simply because they have permanent 
employment contracts) but it seems 
unlikely that high-ranking officials will 
be able to remain in office. It seems 
politically impossible that post-Brexit 
there be British nationals in high-
level positions, for instance heading 
directorates general. Even if most civil 
servants are legally entitled to stay on 
one may question whether they want 
to do so especially since prospects of 
career advancement to higher positions 
for the around 1,000 British citizens 
working for the Commission wil l 
diminish. Of course, depending on the 
post-Brexit agreement between the EU 
and the UK, these individuals might 
then have to secure work permits to 
work and live in Brussels, unlike the EU 
citizens that work for the institution. 
It is thus not surprising that reports of 
these individuals seeking to acquire 
Belgian citizenship have emerged. 
The situation is similar for the almost 
300 British nationals working for the 
European Parliament’s administration 
on permanent contracts. 
For the European Parliament a significant 
uncertainty relates to Brexit’s impact 
on MEPs and voting patterns. While 
MEPs are expected to sit until the end 
of their mandate, which will more or 
less coincide with the end of Brexit 
negotiations in 2019, things will get 
tricky if the two-year negotiating period 
will be extended. In that scenario the 
question that will emerge is whether 
next European Elections, scheduled for 
2019, will also be held in the United 
Kingdom. Be that as it may, once Brexit 
enters into force, voting dynamics in 
the European Parliament will change as 
Brexit is expected to strengthen the left 
in the European Parliament given that 
British MEPs are traditionally part of the 
right-leaning political blocs.
Brexit will finally also lead to other 
significant institutional ramifications for 
instance with respect to the EU agencies 
that are based in the UK. The European 
Medicines Agency and the European 
Banking Authority are currently located 
in London and will have to relocate. 
Other Member States have indeed 
already started lobbying for the agencies 
to be re-established on their territory.
Th ink ing about  Brex i t  f rom any 
per spec t i ve  revea l s  the  l ack  o f 
predictability that is inherent to both the 
process itself and also its ramifications. 
This is no different for an examination of 
the processes’ institutional dimension. 
While some of the difficulties can 
be predicted, EU law itself provides 
re la t i ve ly  l i t t le  ins ight  in to  the 
institutional nature of the negotiation 
process and the post-Brexit EU as these 
are largely shaped by political dynamics. 
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